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The issues surrounding Turkey’s “sliding” into the war with the Entente after 10 August 1914 have been studied well enough in the historical 
literature.1 But there still remains a lacuna as regards the events that took 
place between 5 and 10 August. As far as this “five-day” issue is concerned, 
Russian historiography has not yet overcome sensationalism in presenting 
facts and simplification in drawing conclusions from their analysis. Western 
historiography has not given an unambiguous answer to these questions 
* inslav@inslav.ru
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either. So U. Trumpener, in his account of the facts and their analysis, makes 
an error strange for a scholar of his stature. M. Aksakal takes an approach 
which is quite reminiscent of the “figure of omission”. Other authors either 
mention this issue in passing or skip it over completely. 
What happened between 5 and 10 August 1914? In those few days 
the Turkish leadership presented the Russian diplomatic representatives in 
Constantinople with proposals for a military alliance, which were eventually 
rejected by the Russian Foreign Ministry despite persistent urgings from 
the Russian Embassy. On 10 August the German warships Goeben and Bre-
slau entered the Dardanelles and the situation radically changed, and even 
though the change was not in Russia’s favour, things were still far from be-
ing hopeless. 
Interpretations of these events in Russian historiography have been 
following a uniform pattern. Firstly, the Turks were deeply insincere when 
making their proposals because they had already, on 2 August, concluded a 
secret treaty of alliance with Germany. Secondly, the purpose of the Turkish 
initiatives was simply to buy the time needed to carry through the mobilisa-
tion ordered upon the outbreak of war in Europe. Thirdly, there can simply 
be no other explanation for those events given the Turkish war minister En-
ver Pasha’s Germanophilia and Turkey’s complete dependence on Germany 
at the time the war broke out. Fourthly, Russia was not even in a position 
to accept the Turkish offers of alliance because of her complete dependence 
on the Entente allies which would not have allowed her to pursue such an 
arrangement. Let us try to look into this tangle of events and circumstances.
Firstly, they were much more complex, multifaceted, contradictory 
and short-lived than most historians seem to think. Thus Trumpener, who 
is the main expert on the subject, is focused on refuting the thesis about 
Germany’s overriding influence on Turkey, and indeed convincingly argues 
against it. But that is only one aspect of this multifaceted problem. 
Secondly, Russian historiography has developed so strong a prejudice 
with regard to Turkey that it cannot help affecting the validity of schol-
arly conclusions. That pattern has arisen in consequence of an interweaving 
of approaches during the period of Russia’s alliance with the Entente and 
the period of quite contradictory relations between the former USSR and 
Turkey: from a close friendship and alliance with the Kemalist regime to 
a new and open enmity culminating in 1947, when Turkey joined NATO. 
As a result, all that is accepted as being quite natural in the politics of other 
countries, such as pragmatism, patriotism, professionalism, is resolutely de-
nied to Turkey. The Turks are still perceived as cunning and cruel, and the 
Young Turk regime of 1913–1918 also as “unrestrained adventurism”.
Thirdly, analyses of the actions of Russian diplomacy continue to suf-
fer from the “fascination of power” syndrome. Despite a good deal of direct 
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evidence in the sources and literature, historians often find it difficult to 
accept that the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry can turn out to have 
been unprofessional. As far as his “master”, Nicholas II, is concerned, the 
long-proposed thesis about his intellectual limitations, lack of principle and 
weakness of will remains unrefuted despite all the efforts to the contrary 
made in recent years.
F. Notovich purportedly sought to disprove the views of M. Pok-
rovskii, accusing him of oversimplification, even of falsifying the facts.2 But 
his own considerable effort suffered from the same flaws: an arbitrary pre-
sentation of the facts in favour of a preconceived view. Both authors repre-
sent the official Soviet historiography of different political eras, the former 
of the late 1940s, the latter of the 1920s and 30s. E. Ludshuveit’s interesting 
book, regrettably, barely touched upon the question of Turkey’s entry into 
the war, and when it did, it beat a well-trodden path. What remains the 
worthiest of the old works regardless of the author’s interpretation of events 
from a political rather than a scholarly perspective is a short article of A. 
Miller.
In the period between the end of the Balkan Wars and the begin-
ning of the First World War Turkey faced several serious challenges on 
the resolution of which directly depended her survival as a state (even if 
of limited sovereignty): 1) the need to conclude an alliance with a great 
power to counteract the evident tendency towards the empire’s further frag-
mentation, including the partition of Asia Minor; 2) the need to procure a 
large loan on the European financial market to rescue herself from looming 
bankruptcy the consequences of which would have been unpredictable; the 
urgent need for a loan was caused, apart from the ever weak Ottoman fi-
nancial system, by the enormous costs of the Balkan War and, especially, by 
the Empire’s loss of its most developed, European provinces; the loss of ter-
ritory was accompanied by a mass exodus of Muslim population from Ru-
melia to Anatolia; this led to a huge decline in tax revenue on the one hand, 
and required huge financial resources for their resettlement in Asia Minor 
on the other; 3) the need for further internal reforms and modernisation, 
interrupted by the acute political crises of 1911–12 and the Balkan Wars. In 
that respect, Turkey’s most important task, along with that of building her 
national economy which would not be based on ethnic minorities (Greeks, 
Armenians, Jews), was the abolition of the regime of capitulations.
A second level of problems involved: 1) the resolution of the Greek-
Turkish conflict over the Aegean islands, the possession of which by Greece 
was not recognised by Turkey; the proximity of these islands to the Greek-
2 Notovich, Diplomaticheskaia bor’ba, 286; M. N. Pokrovskii, Imperialisticheskaia voina 
(Moscow 1931), 158.
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inhabited coast of Asia Minor created a danger that the “armed propaganda” 
of the type carried out in Macedonia in 1903–12 might be resumed there; 
2) the settlement, with Russia and other powers, of the issue of reform in 
the “six Armenian vilayets”, which produced another “Macedonian” version 
of gradual withdrawal of Turkey’s sovereignty and partition of her territory, 
this time in Eastern Anatolia;3 3) the strengthening of naval forces neces-
sary for resolving the Greek-Turkish conflict over the islands, as well as the 
reorganisation of the army; 4) the conclusion of an alliance or a treaty of 
benevolent neutrality with Bulgaria for the same purpose; 5) the strength-
ening of ties with Arabs, the second largest Muslim ethnic group in the 
Empire, with whom relations had been aggravated in previous years.
Turkey devoted the entire first half of 1914 to these foreign and do-
mestic policy goals. She made attempts to conclude an alliance with any 
one of the great powers: Britain, France, Russia and Germany. All of them 
ended in failure.4 It should be noted that in her choice of ally Turkey defi-
nitely gave preference to Germany over Russia. To Turkey, Russia posed a 
direct threat, Germany only an indirect one. Germany had never taken part 
in the concerted actions of the powers against Turkey and never encroached 
on her sovereignty. What she had done was to allow her allies, Austro-
Hungary and Italy, to bite off a chunk of the Empire’s territory, Bosnia in 
1908 and Libya in 1911. 
Before the July Crisis, Germany had not been interested in conclud-
ing an alliance with Turkey. The main opponents of such an arrangement 
were the German ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Wangenheim and 
the head of the German military mission General Liman von Sanders. Their 
reports described Turkey as completely unfit for alliance (nichbündnisfähig) 
and expressed their belief that, due to her military weakness, she would not 
only be unable to engage Russian forces in the Caucasus on her own but 
would have to be supported there by the German army.5
3 J. Heller, “Britain and the Armenian Question, 1912–1914: A Study in Realpolitik”, 
Middle Eastern Studies XVI (1980), 3–26.
4 On Turkey’s attempts to conclude an alliance with Great Britain see F. Ahmad, “Great 
Britain’s Relations with the Young Turks, 1908–1914”, Middle Eastern Studies II (1966), 
321–324; F. Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire”, in Kent, ed., Great Powers, 11–13; 
M. Kent, “Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900–23”, in Kent, ed., 
Great Powers, 191; with France: Djemal Pasha, Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman 1913–
1919 (New York 1922), 104–107; with Germany: Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire, 15–19; with Russia: Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 45; S. D. Sazonov, Vospomi-
naniia (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1991 [1927]), 160–165.
5 Jagow to German Ambassadors, Vienna and Constantinople, 14 July 1914, quoted in 
E. Jackh, The Rising Crescent (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), 10. 
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The initiative to conclude an alliance with Turkey came from Aus-
tria-Hungary and was put forward by her ambassador in Constantinople 
Marquis Pallavicini. Austria-Hungary was interested in the anti-Serbian 
character of an alliance with Turkey (and Bulgaria) for defeating Serbia, 
revising the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913, and creating an autonomous 
Macedonia. From Vienna, a new Balkan alliance was seen as the alliance of 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey aimed firstly against Serbia and only 
secondly, on account of Turkish interests, against Greece as Serbia’s ally.
The Turkish vision of a Balkan alliance was somewhat different. The 
Turks sought either an offensive alliance with Bulgaria aimed firstly against 
Greece and only secondly, on account of Bulgarian (and Austrian) interests, 
against Serbia, or a defensive alliance with Romania and, again, Greece for 
the purpose of maintaining neutrality under the auspices of Germany, and 
aimed against Russia and Bulgaria in case the latter should go to the side of 
the Entente. But the Turks did not look at an alliance with Austria-Hunga-
ry as a great power from a strategic perspective but rather in regional terms.
It was Wilhelm II’s change of mind on the idea of Germany’s al-
liance with Turkey that proved to be decisive. Under new circumstances 
the Kaiser believed that “every gun in the Balkans must be kept ready to 
be fired at the Slavs for Austria”, and instructed the Foreign Ministry and 
the German Military Mission accordingly.6 The initiative group of Young 
Turk supporters of an alliance with Germany (in fact, with a great power), 
which included war minister Enver, grand vizier Said Halim, interior min-
ister Talaat and justice minister Halil, promptly jumped at the opportunity. 
By 1 August Enver and Talaat had already been aware of the confiscation of 
two Turkish dreadnoughts by the British, and used it as an argument to win 
over the hesitant ministers, primarily marine minister Djemal and finance 
minister Djavid. 
An alliance with Germany could give Turkey safeguards against the 
expected Russian landing on the Bosporus. But it could not help her to solve 
the problems of the Aegean islands, Western Thrace, autonomous Macedo-
nia, not to mention the abolition of the capitulations and the procurement 
of a loan. Therefore, her best option was to declare neutrality.7 
The issue of a Turkish-Bulgarian alliance was closely connected with 
the Greek-Turkish conflict. The vicissitudes of its conclusion are quite well 
known. But the oft-overlooked fact is that, after the outbreak of war in 
Europe, the Turks, while trying to conclude an alliance with the Bulgarians, 
6 Wangenheim to Foreign Ministry, no. 362, 22 July 1914; K. Kautsky, Outbreak of the 
World War. German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky and edited by Max Montgelas and 
Walther Schücking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 156–158.
7 Miller, Vstuplenie Turtsii, 325.
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also feared the possibility of their thrust towards Constantinople in order to 
reach the Enos-Midia line (and perhaps even beyond). Those very concerns 
were the main reason for the Turks to order mobilisation and concentration 
of troops in Thrace. Still, on 22 July, Enver revealed to Wangenheim another 
reason for Turkey’s seeking alliance with a great power: to provide protec-
tion to her until she had an alliance concluded with one of the regional 
countries, either Bulgaria or Greece. The majority of the Cabinet leant 
towards Bulgaria, but negotiations with Greece about a defensive alliance 
based on a compromise on the islands issue were also to begin in Brussels, 
brokered by the British journalist E. Dillon. If both Bulgaria and Turkey, 
Enver stated, joined the German bloc, Turkey would reject the Greek pro-
posal.8 The Balkan puzzle was intricate indeed. 
The Turkish pre-war attempts to procure a large loan in Europe 
and to get the issue of the abolition of the capitulatory system to the table 
had been equally unsuccessful. The latter intention faced strong opposition 
both from the European powers and from the USA. The only power that 
was tolerantly disposed to the issue was Russia, though primarily due to 
her weak position in the Turkish economy and her correspondingly weak 
role in legal regulation of commercial and other disputes.9 In analysing 
the Turkish leadership’s consideration of the “Russian option”, this factor, 
underestimated in historiography, should be counted among the crucial 
ones. 
The Greek-Turkish conflict was the acutest diplomatic crisis in Eu-
rope since the end of the one produced by the Liman von Sanders affair. It 
is believed that, had the shots not been fired in Sarajevo in June 1914, the 
shots that would have started a “third Balkan war”, likely to escalate into 
a European one, would inevitably have been fired in the Aegean in July or 
August the same year. The conflict over the islands was only the tip of the 
iceberg that was a much broader Greek-Turkish conflict over supremacy 
in the Aegean, including the straits and Constantinople. Moreover, it was 
closely linked with Turkey’s internal problems, namely the situation and 
destiny of national-religious minorities and the resettlement of huge num-
bers of refugees from Macedonia and Thrace expelled after the Balkan Wars. 
The utmost importance Turkey attached to the islands question may be seen 
from her offer to cede them to Serbia (!) and to transfer ecclesiastical juris-
diction over the Christians of Asia Minor from the Greek Patriarchate of 
8 Kautsky, Outbreak of the World War, 156–158, doc. no. 117. 
9 Mezdunarodnyie otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo 
i vremenogo pravitel ’stv (herafter MOEI), ser. 3, vol. VI, 1 (Moscow-Leningrad 1935), 
141–143, 155–156.
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Constantinople to the Serbian Church. Driven into a corner, Turkey was 
ready to try the most incredible diplomatic combinations.10 
The naval arms race that had begun there before the Balkan Wars 
was rapidly gaining pace. In intensity it did not lag behind the arms race 
between England and Germany in the North Sea. After the onset of the 
July Crisis the interrelatedness of those two arms races proved to be fatal for 
the destiny of the Turkish navy and a very important factor in the decision 
making process in Constantinople in late July 1914, ending in the seizure by 
Britain of two Turkish dreadnoughts built in her shipyards.
This issue has been extensively described in the literature.11 The funds 
for the procurement of the ships had been raised by national subscription, 
and not only in Turkey but across the Islamic world. Donations came even 
from India and Morocco. Turkish women would cut and sell their hair and 
their jewellery, schoolchildren gave up their pocket money to contribute to 
the national Navy League, army officers and state officials contributed a 
monthly salary. The building of the dreadnoughts was not perceived merely 
as the strengthening of the navy but also as a symbol of the country’s renew-
al and further modernisation. To think of the seizure of the ships merely 
in terms of a convenient excuse for the Young Turks’ campaigning against 
the Entente is clearly inadequate.12 It was a deep shock for the nation, once 
again made aware of its humiliatingly unequal position in the contemporary 
world.
It is evident that the British confiscation of the Turkish dreadnoughts 
on 31 July and the escape through the Dardanelles of the German warships 
Goeben and Breslau on 10 August 1914 were closely linked in the political 
deliberations of the Turkish leadership in early August.13 To some extent 
(albeit very limited), the Turks could consider the German ships as a kind 
of compensation for their confiscated dreadnoughts. 
But between those two dates something else that immensely out-
weighed the two “purely naval” factors occurred. On 4 August Great Britain 
entered the war. This factor upset all Turkish calculations on which their 
decision to conclude an alliance with Germany on 2 August had been based. 
Besides an abrupt change in the relative strength of the opposing sides, 
between 4 and 10 August there could be no guarantees that the Goeben and 
Breslau would manage to escape into the Dardanelles without being inter-
cepted by the British fleet. All of that complicated the situation greatly and 
10 V. N. Shtrandtman, Balkanskie vospominaniia (Moscow: Knizhnitsa, 2014), 330.
11 R. Hough, The Big Battleship (London: Michael Joseph, 1966), 120; W. S. Churchill, 
The World Crisis 1911–1914 (London: T. Butterworth, 1923), 209. 
12 Miller, Vstuplenie Turtsii, 326; Ludshuveit, Turtsia v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny, 38.
13 Churchill, World Crisis, 482. 
Balcanica XLVI (2015)142
led the Turks to improvise in anticipation of possible adverse developments. 
The Entente turned out to be much stronger than Enver and his group had 
expected, and Germany’s victory did not seem so certain. 
On the other hand, since 4 August, a new tune could be heard in 
German-Turkish relations. It was on that day that the Goeben and Breslau 
received instructions to head for Constantinople. So, was the fact that Enver 
was acquainted with the ships’ destination in contradiction to his decision 
to slow down the German tune and start playing a Russian one instead? 
Not at all. It only meant that he kept his options open until making the final 
decision. Just as the offer of alliance made to Russia on 5 August was not in 
contradiction to exacting from Germany the following day, 6 August, much 
more favourable alliance terms than those agreed on 2 August. In those days 
Great Britain’s entry into the war was a factor that played a decisive role not 
only for the Turks but also for the Germans. It led to the renegotiation, on 
6 August, of the German-Turkish alliance because now Turkey became a 
much more useful ally to Germany not only against Russia but also against 
Britain. 
In Russian historiography, much of which is obviously obsolete, it 
is taken as self-evident that the complex of domestic and foreign policy 
challenges with which Turkey had been faced in the first half of 1914 sud-
denly vanished after the outbreak of the war, and that it was replaced by one 
simple idea, that of entering into a war with Russia on the side of Germany. 
This point of view, inherited from the First World War military propa-
ganda, cannot be considered scholarly acceptable now, a hundred years after 
the events studied. The complex of problems did not disappear. Moreover, 
their context became much more complicated with the ambiguous Greek 
and Bulgarian position on their own neutrality, Russia’s fears that the straits 
might be closed, as well as her military incapacity to carry out an amphibi-
ous operation against the Bosporus. To be able to interpret all of them prop-
erly, one should bear in mind that the political and diplomatic situation in 
the Aegean, in the straits area, and in the Balkans as a whole in the August 
and September of 1914 was changing dramatically on a daily basis. The 
decision-makers were often unable to respond with insight and resolve to 
this kaleidoscopic sequence of developments. 
On 5 August war minister Enver Pasha met with the Russian mili-
tary attaché General Leontiev to clarify the actual purpose of the Turkish 
mobilisation, but he also made an unexpected offer of alliance. Enver offered 
Russia to use the Turkish army “to neutralise the army of any one Balkan 
country that should act against Russia, to facilitate the actions of the Balkan 
states’ armies against Austria should Russia manage to reconcile the Balkan 
states and Turkey on the basis of mutual concessions”. The diplomatic com-
bination of mutual concessions envisaged the cession of the Aegean islands 
R. R. Subaev, Some Issues of Turkey’s Entry into the First World War 143
and Western Thrace to Turkey with compensations for Greece in Epirus, for 
Bulgaria in Macedonia, and for Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 
In Enver’s view, such a “combination” would be accepted gladly by 
both the Turkish government and the people. If it materialised, the same 
day Enver would say to the Germans: “Now you are our enemies and I am 
asking you to leave.” During his meeting with Leontiev, Enver repeatedly 
assured him that Turkey was guided only by her own interests.
Whom was the Turkish army supposed to “neutralise”? Taking into 
account the specific diplomatic circumstances of August 1914, there could 
have been two possibilities. One was an alliance of Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece 
and Serbia against Austria-Hungary under the auspices of Russia. The oth-
er was a Turkish-Russian alliance to neutralise Bulgaria either in the event 
of her attack on Serbia or her encroachment on the Russian sphere of inter-
est in Eastern Thrace and the straits. At the next meeting between Enver 
and Leontiev, on 9 August, things were made clear: “by order of Russia” the 
Turkish army could be moved against any of the Balkan countries, includ-
ing Bulgaria, or together with them against Austria.15 A ten-year alliance 
treaty with Russia was supposed to turn her away as an immediate threat 
to Turkey. 
On 5 August the Russian ambassador Girs sent five telegrams to Sa-
zonov. Stating his position, Girs allowed for the possibility both of an alli-
ance with Turkey and of a war against her, Germany and Bulgaria. Sazonov 
instructed him to continue contacts with Enver.16 Aksakal claims that Girs’s 
telegram of 6 August (!) was intercepted by the Turks. Would that mean 
that the Turks read the other telegrams from the Russian Embassy too? 
Aksakal does not say. Moreover, he argues that the content of this telegram 
relating to Russia’s ambition to finally assert herself in the straits made the 
Turks aware of Russia’s insincerity and hostile intent against the very exis-
tence of the empire. This was, in his opinion, the motive behind their opt-
ing for an alliance with Germany.17 The Turks hardly needed to intercept 
telegrams to know the real intentions of Russia towards their country. This 
is certainly the weakest point in Aksakal’s otherwise very good book, which 
does not make any further reference to the issue of Russo-Turkish negotia-
tions of 5–9 August.
Trumpener, in line with Russian historiography, believes that “there 
can no longer be any doubt that these curious overtures by Enver [...] 
were insincere. Quite aside from the fact that Enver’s proposals provided 
14 MOEI, 3, VI, 1, 8–9.
15 Ibid. 42–43.
16 Ibid. 9, 19.
17 Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 92.
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a perfect cover story for the intended concentration of Ottoman troops in 
Thrace, it is now also clear that he kept the German Embassy informed 
about his talks with the Russians.”18 To prove his thesis, Trumpener refers 
to Wangenheim’s two telegrams to the German Foreign Ministry, of 10 and 
18 August respectively. But early in the morning of 10 August the Goeben 
and Breslau had already appeared off the entrance to the Dardanelles! Had 
Wangenheim’s first telegram been sent on 9 August, or at least in the night 
of 9/10 August, Trumpener’s argument would have some weight. But it was 
not, and the argument falls apart. And Enver could have been “sincere” both 
on 5 and on 9 August.
After all, what kind of “sincerity” can there be in diplomacy? One 
can only speak of professionalism and competence or lack thereof. And 
why would Enver’s “cunning and insincerity” have been necessarily directed 
only against the Russians? Since scores of recent works, including those by 
Trumpener himself, have refuted the view about Turkey’s dependence on 
Germany and debunked the legend of Enver’s being merely a “German 
protégé”, such views do not seem too credible. Enver was a calculating and 
cynical pragmatist.
Sazonov at last replied to Girs on 10 August. The content and style 
of, and corrections to, his telegram raise doubts about his adequate under-
standing of what was happening and his psychological condition. It seems 
that by then Sazonov had not yet realised on the edge of what an abyss Rus-
sia was standing. Nor did Tsar Nikolas II make things any clearer. His only 
comment on Girs’s main telegram of 5 August was: “Curious.”19 
We know now that the closing of the straits by Turkey after she 
joined the Central Powers was one of the main causes of Russia’s defeat 
in the First World War and of the collapse of the Russian Empire. Some 
astute observers understood that as early as January 1915:
It should now be evident that there is much to be said for the view that the 
key to the present situation is Constantinople. We are dealing with world 
politics, with a world war which is being fought on the battlefields of Eu-
rope; but we are dealing with a world war whose results are not expected to 
develop in Europe proper. The key to this situation lies in Constantinople, 
and the Turk holds it.20
Express instructions to Girs required a delay until a reply was received 
from Sofia. It turns out that it was Russian and not Turkish diplomacy that 
18 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 25.
19 Quoted in Miller, Vstuplenie Turtsii, 328. 
20 R. G. Usher, “Why Turkey Entered the War”, in F. J. Reynolds and A. L. Church-
ill, eds., World’s War Events, vol. I (New York: P. F. Collier & Son Comp., 1919), 140. 
Usher’s chapter was originally published in the monthly World’s Work, January 1915.
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was stalling on the matter or that, at least, both of them were. Sazonov 
wrote:
Until we get a response from Sofia [crossed out: “I ask you to sustain En-
ver’s hope of obtaining a favourable response from P[e]t[ers]b[ur]g”], keep 
in mind the need for buying time in the course of negotiations with Enver. 
Keep in mind that we do not fear Turkey’s direct actions against us. 
However, while maintaining quite friendly communication with the Turks, 
try to make them aware that, if they should act without our sanction they 
will risk all of Asia Minor because they are not able to harm us while 
we, and in alliance with France and England, can jeopardise their very 
existence.21
In the first days of August Bulgaria figured as an important factor in 
diplomatic calculations of not only Turkey but also of Russia and her allies, 
mainly in connection with the Austro-Serbian conflict and her potential in-
volvement in it. For Sazonov, as we can see, the Bulgarian factor outweighed 
the Turkish one. It was a miscalculation which was impossible to correct.
We do not know when exactly Girs received this document but we 
know that the German ships Goeben and Breslau appeared off the entrance 
to the Dardanelles in the early morning of 10 August and, after the dramatic 
events in the building of the Turkish Ministry of War, entered the straits in 
the evening. Although the admission of the ships had been agreed between 
Germany and Turkey earlier, there arose some unexpected difficulties. The 
American historian B. Tuchman believes that Enver “was more than will-
ing to give permission for entrance but he had to play a complicated game 
vis-à-vis his more nervous colleagues.” In my opinion, it was Enver’s nerves 
that gave in. 
Later the same day an exchange took place between Enver and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Kress von Kressenstein of the German Military Mission. 
Kress von Kressenstein told Enver that the commander at Chanak request-
ed instructions concerning the German ships. Enver replied that he was 
unable to grant permission without consulting the grand vizier. Kress von 
Kressenstein insisted that the Chanak fort requested an immediate reply. 
Enver was perfectly silent for a few minutes, and then said abruptly: “They 
are to be allowed to enter.”
“If the English warships follow them in, are they to be fired at?” Kress 
von Kressenstein asked next. Again Enver refused to answer, claiming that 
the Cabinet had to be consulted; but Kress von Kressenstein insisted that 
21 MOEI, VII, 1, 44. See therein also the distortion of the document in the Russian 
“Orange book”.
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the fort should not be left without clear instructions. “Are the English to be 
fired at or not?” After a long pause, Enver finally said: “Yes.”22
Enver’s indecisiveness seems quite strange for the Germanophile that 
historiography tends to make out of him, who should have been eagerly await-
ing the arrival of the ships whose destination had been known to him since 4 
August. Was it fear: did the ghost of Admiral Duckworth stand before him 
in the person of Admiral Milne? or calculation: did Enver expect until the last 
moment to receive St. Petersburg’s positive reply to the offer of alliance and 
guarantees for the integrity of the Empire? We may never know. 
It may seem that the choice that the Turks faced in the morning and 
afternoon of 10 August was the one between an alliance with Russia and 
the German warships. But things were more complicated than that. The 
Turks were not wrong in their assessment either of the chances for an alli-
ance with Russia to last (not only on the basis of the intercepted telegram, 
of course) or of the future status of the Goeben in the Turkish navy in the 
event of their alliance with Germany. They also clearly understood the posi-
tion of the Entente as regards their country’s future. Their experience from 
the negotiations with the Entente’s members in recent months had clearly 
showed them that it could not be trusted. But, at the same time, the stron-
gest factor was Britain’s entry into the war (and Italy’s non-entry). 
By 10 August Turkey could and should have made a choice (had 
Russian diplomacy been more professional) between Germany and Russia, 
and also between her entry into the war and neutrality. But Russian diplo-
macy was hopelessly belated in its actions, and naively self-assured of them. 
After the entry of England into the war and the arrival of the Goeben 
and Breslau, the structure of factions in the Young Turk leadership became 
much more complicated. Apart from supporters of a “great” and a “small” 
war, now there were also supporters of a prompt and a delayed entry into the 
great war, and a weak faction of neutralists. The multiplicity of diplomatic 
motivations led to differing positions on war objectives amongst the Young 
Turk leaders. While before 4 August Enver had anticipated a general Eu-
ropean war from which he believed the Central Powers would soon emerge 
victorious, grand vizier Said Halim was still thinking in terms of a limited 
Balkan conflict in which Turkey and Bulgaria would ally against Greece 
and Serbia. Thus, for Said Halim, anxious about Russian interference, an al-
liance with Germany seemed to guarantee the empire’s territorial integrity; 
for Enver, it provided the opportunity to launch military operations in the 
Balkans combined with a call to jihad in the rest of the empire and beyond. 
22 B. Tuchman, Guns of August: The Outbreak of World War I (New York 1994 [1962]), 
186. It is noteworthy that chapter X where these events are described is omitted in both 
Russian editions of Tuchman’s book.
R. R. Subaev, Some Issues of Turkey’s Entry into the First World War 147
The difference in views on war aims entailed different views on the timing 
of military intervention: while Enver wanted to enter the war immediately, 
the more circumspect Said Halim was not willing to commit to military in-
tervention until the Central Powers’ victory became certain.23 After Britain 
entered the war, the rift between Enver and Said Halim diminished but did 
not disappear. Some General Staff officers from Enver’s inner circle, such as 
Ali Ihsan Sabis, Hafiz Hakki and Kazim Karabekir, also preferred to delay 
Turkey’s entry into the war until the spring of 1915.24
The question of the timing of the entry into the war determined the 
choice of ally – it was to be the victorious side. In this respect Turkey’s 
stance was not any different from that of Italy, Romania and Bulgaria.
After 10 August every diplomatic action the warring sides under-
took towards Turkey weakened or strengthened the position of one or an-
other Young Turk faction. Since Germany, however reluctantly, did meet 
Turkey’s wishes, whereas the Entente powers continued to hold her un-
der the sword of Damocles of partition, it is not surprising that the scales 
had been slowly but surely tipping to the German side over almost three 
months. But German-Turkish relations were far from idyllic even after 10 
August. They experienced two acute crises, first on 19–22 August, and then 
on 14–22 October. Yet, five weeks intervened between the resolution of the 
latter and Turkey’s actual entry into the war. Aksakal correctly assesses these 
developments: “This was a classic deadlock: while the Germans demanded 
intervention to achieve military victory, the Ottomans demanded German 
military victory before they were willing to commit to intervention.”25 Yet, 
during the October crisis the Turks had to make the final choice. 
Acting on instructions from Berlin, Wangenheim had made the 
German position absolutely clear at the meeting with the grand vizier on 
19 September. By continuing to stall intervention, he stated, the Ottoman 
Empire was increasingly losing any claim to spoils. If the empire waited for 
victory to be ensured before it intervened, the German government would 
hardly reward the Turks for their participation.26 
23 Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire”, 238–239.
24 Ali İhsan Sabis, Harp Hatıralarım, vol II (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1992), 59–
60, 63; Kazım Karabekir, Birinci Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik, vol. II (Istanbul: Emre 
Yaymlari, 1995), 316–317.
25 Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 138; on the two crises see pp. 137–141 and 156–163 
therein.
26 F. Ahmad, “Ottoman Armed Neutrality and Intervention. Aug. – Nov. 1914”, Studies 
on Ottoman Diplomatic History 4 (1990), 68–69; Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire, 40–41.
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This date should be considered a turning point for the Turkish lead-
ership’s decision to enter the war on Germany’s side. Now it was just a 
matter of time. The decisive factor was the prospect of a German loan of 
100 million francs. Turkey had by then already resolved the capitulations 
issue unilaterally. On 9 September she had sent a note to the great powers 
notifying them of the abolition of the capitulations without any conditions 
or reservations with effect from 1 October. Germany’s decision to extend 
a loan was the final argument that irrevocably tipped the scales to her side. 
However, the position of the moderate faction of ministers and military in-
terested in postponing military intervention was not yet hopeless, for Enver 
and Admiral Souchon needed a provocation to finally draw Turkey into the 
war. All those issues are also very well known.27 On 29 October naval hos-
tilities commenced and a few days later war was declared. 
The conclusion is that Turkey entered the war guided primarily by 
her own interests and pursuing her own political and economic goals. That 
she finally made a choice in favour of Germany was as much a fault of the 
Entente as it was of Turkey herself. 
An alliance with Russia was nothing more than one of the options in 
the Young Turk leadership’s bid to solve the general and regional problems 
the country was facing. Turkish diplomacy used every opportunity and kept 
open every alternative. That was pragmatic, patriotic and professional. As 
for cynicism, there is always some in diplomacy. 
As for the Young Turk leaders’ capacity for making strategic deci-
sions, the notion of the “Young Turk triumvirate”, Enver, Talaat and Dje-
mal, as being the ruling core of Turkish politics should be revised. In fact, 
the governing body of the Young Turk regime was a narrow circle of about 
thirty people, both active and former members of the Central Committee 
of the Party of Union and Progress.28 The highest-ranking leaders acting in 
the foreground could take very bold actions (“adventurous”, according to 
historiography), and they did, but they nonetheless needed approval from 
the veiled collective leadership of the Young Turks. 
Given the presently available sources, it is very difficult to unravel the 
motives of Russian diplomacy. There is no doubt that there was some cyni-
cism in it too. Whether Russia’s unwillingness to assume treaty obligations 
towards Turkey stemmed from the fear of the inevitable internationalisation 
of such a treaty (as it had already been the case in 1833–41), or from the 
desire to keep Turkey in uncertainty until the expected rapid victory over 
the Central Powers with the view to dividing her territory, or, quite the op-
posite, from the fear that such an alliance might strengthen Turkey in the 
27 Karpat, “Entry”, 27–30; Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 178–182.
28 Trumpener, Turkey’s Entry, 371, n. 12.
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course of a new Balkan war – is yet to be established. But in any case, Turkey 
did not want to be dismembered. 
UDC 94(560)”1914”
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